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Abstract. We report the experience gained in an e-Health project in
the Gauteng province, in South Africa. A Proof-of-Concept of the project
has been already installed in 3 clinics in the Sebokeng township. The
project is now going to be applied to 300 clinics in the whole province.
This extension of the Proof-of-Concept can however give rise to security
flaws because of the inclusion of rural areas with unreliable Internet
connection. We address this problem and propose a safe solution.
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curity, healthcare technology standards, e-Health experiences
1 Introduction
In recent years the importance of healthcare systems based on Electronic Health
Records (EHRs) has been addressed by governments and institutions. An EHR
is a set of sensitive data written in a machine readable format (e.g., the Hl7’s
CDA [1]) containing the healthcare history of a patient, such as vital signs,
prescribed medicines, billing, and the patient summary.
Many projects have been started worldwide with the aim of developing sys-
tems for electronic healthcare (e-Health) based on EHRs sharing and capable
of providing optimum patient care (see, e.g., [2, 3]). To ensure fallbacks and
interoperability, such systems need to be built using international, well-known,
and open standards, due to the impact on financing and governance that they
might have. Large investments are conducted by governments, therefore a good
confidence in the project success is needed. For this reason the initiative In-
tegrating the Healthcare Enterprises (IHE, [4]) was founded with the goal of
tailoring already existing standards (such as [1, 5, 6]) in the context of Service-
Oriented Architectures for setting up e-Health projects. IHE thus provides a
standard methodology for building applications in which EHRs exchange plays
a significant role.
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By adopting standard technologies, governments and hospitals obtain signif-
icant benefits from both a financial and a practical point of view. E-HR.GP [7]
is an example of an ongoing project based on IHE standard technologies aim-
ing at managing EHRs of patients from the Gauteng province, South Africa. A
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) of such project has been successfully installed in the
Sebokeng township [8]. The next step of the E-HR.GP project is the extension
of the PoC implementation to cover the clinics of the overall Gauteng province.
The process of creating e-Health systems, however, is not just a merely adop-
tion of healthcare standards. Indeed, these standards are often designed with the
assumption of a high-speed network infrastructure in place, which is not always
the case when considering rural areas of developing countries. This can result
in a set of security flaws in the authentication process of healthcare profession-
als due to missing requirements on technology (e.g., implicit assumptions on
communication channels, such as availability and reliability). Therefore, since
a considerable area of the Gauteng province suffers from the above mentioned
connectivity problems, we believe that such security flaws would occur in the
extension of the PoC, unless suitable measures are taken. In this paper, we
tackle the problem of amending the system developed in the E-HR.GP’s PoC
by proposing the use of a formally-proved correct IHE-based protocol [9], so to
include also clinics in rural areas with low or absent Internet connectivity and
reachable only by hundred of kilometers of sand tracks.
To sum up, the main contributions of this work are: 1) the presentation of
the outcome of the current status of the E-HR.GP’s PoC; 2) the identification
of potential authentication problems that can arise in the extension of the PoC;
3) the proposal of adopting of a formally-proved secure protocol for connecting
clinics in rural environments.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an
overview of the E-HR.GP project. In Section 3, we discuss major problems to
tackle when extending the application of the project to include more clinics and
how to solve them by means of an IHE-based protocol. In Section 4, we touch
upon more closely related work. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2 The E-HR.GP project
Before the starting of the E-HR.GP project, some clinics of the Gauteng region
were already equipped with Clinical Information Systems [7]. These systems,
however, were not interoperable and were not based on international standards,
resulting in an high cost of ownership. In fact, in each clinic, long patient queues
and slow response times were experienced, which often led to preventable deaths.
To provide a better patient care, in 2007 the Gauteng Department of Health
(GDoH) issued a request for proposal (RFP) for enabling e-Health in the region.
Fourteen companies answered to the RFP, and six of them were shortlisted. At
the end, one preferred supplier and one reserve were chosen. The preferred sup-
Providing e-Health for Rural Areas in Developing Countries 3
Clinic1
Clinic1:
Document creator
Clinic1:
Forward queue
GDoH:
Backup node
Data aggregator:
DB
Clinic2:
Document consumer
CreateDoc(doc1)
CreatePatId(doc1,pat1)
Register(doc1,pat1)
Register(doc1,pat1)
Link(pat1,123^^^&ISO)
Query(pat2,info1)
Query(pat2,info1)
QueryResp(doc1,pat1,Clinic1)
Query(pat1,info2)
QueryResp(doc2,pat1,Clinic1)
Enqueue(doc1,pat1)
Query(pat2,info2)
Fig. 1. Messages exchange in the E-HR.GP Proof-of-Concept
plier (the Baoki Consortium1) realized the PoC within the time frame defined
(from august 2007 to august 2008). The project is divided in three phases: the
first phase consists of the definition of the PoC, the second is the full imple-
mentation of the PoC, and the third the application to the whole region. In the
first two phases, three clinics (Johan Deo, Levai Mbatha, and Dr. Helga Kuhn
Clinic) and the 700-beds Sebokeng hospital were involved.
2.1 Proof-of-Concept software architecture
The three clinics and the hospital run the same software components (actually,
the hospital is considered as a ‘big’ clinic). The common messages exchange in
such an architecture is depicted in Figure 1, where a clinic creates a document
belonging to an EHR, which is spread over the clinic’s network, and then another
clinic tries to fetch it.
Specifically, a document doc1, e.g., a patient summary, is created (and locally
stored) in a generic clinic, Clinic1. The document belongs to a patient, whose
identifier pat1 is chosen by Clinic1. The document, its metadata and the newly
created patient identifier are enveloped in a message queued in a software actor,
named Forward queue. When the Forward queue processes the message, this is
duplicated: one copy is sent through the IHE-based transaction Register to a node
located into the GDoH offices, while using the same transaction a second copy is
sent to the Data aggregator. The Backup node installed at the GDoH offices has
the task to provide a working backup image for each clinic. This reliable node
should contain the data of all clinics. The Data aggregator is another reliable
1 Baoki is a consortium created by two South African resellers, Equiton Investment
(Pty) Ltd and AMEtHST (Pty) Ltd.
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node that instead acts as a forwarder: whenever a request for a given patient
is received, it returns its copy of the document and the link to the clinic where
the data were originally stored; every subsequent query about the patient will
be delivered directly to the clinic, without passing through the Data aggregator.
Notably, the Data aggregator contains all the patients’ local identifiers and
their data as registered in the clinics. These local identifiers are linked together
(through a Link transaction) by means of an identifier that is unique for the
whole Gauteng province. In our example pat1 is linked to 123ˆˆˆ&ISO (the
patient identifier is written using a notation a` la Hl7 [1]).
Now, suppose that a doctor sitting in Clinic2 wants to retrieve a document
containing information info1 for a patient identified by pat2. Clinic2 does not
know where information about the patient pat2 can be retrieved, therefore the
Data aggregator is contacted, using the IHE-based transaction named Query.
The Data aggregator knows the patient identifier, which is actually linked to
123ˆˆˆ&ISO too (i.e. pat1 and pat2 identify the same patient, resolved by means
of demographics queries [4]). This patient has documents into Clinic1 and, hence,
the Data aggregator returns this information to Clinic2, together with the patient
identifier pat1. For a given amount of time, this information is cached in Clinic2
and all the subsequent queries for pat2 will be sent to Clinic1 directly. Indeed, in
the last pair of Query/QueryResp transactions in Figure 1, a document consumer
asks for information info2 for patient pat2; Clinic2 now is informed that the
patient is known as pat1 at Clinic1 and, hence, directly sends the query to Clinic1
for patient pat1.
2.2 The IHE model
Each clinic involved in the PoC uses an e-Health system based on the IHE
Cross Enterprise Document Sharing (XDS) model [4], depicted in Figure 2. The
XDS model uses a central document registry that acts as a catalogue for the
data. The document source (e.g., a medical device) produces healthcare data for
patients and store data into one or more document repositories (e.g., databases).
The repositories extract metadata and update the registry. Then, possibly quite
long time later, the document consumer (e.g., a doctor’s workstation) queries the
registry and obtains a link to the repositories from where data can be downloaded
and displayed to the doctor.
In IHE standards, building blocks of e-Health systems are defined in profiles
that expose a set of requirements. Two or more profiles are grouped together
by merging their respective requirements. The resulting system can be grouped
again with other profiles for building a complete e-Health solution.
When dealing with such sensible data as EHRs, security and privacy play a
crucial role. Aspects like confidentiality, authentication, integrity and authoriza-
tion are crucial for the success of any e-Health project. The IHE security model is
based on the Audit Trail and Node Authentication (ATNA) profile [4]: each sys-
tem is classified as either secure application or secure node. A secure application
is a system that permits to establish Transport Layer Security (TLS) channels
for exchanging medical records using IHE-defined transactions. A secure node
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Fig. 2. The XDS model grouped with ATNA and XUA profiles
is a secure application where no other way to access patient’s data exists (i.e.
there is no physical access to the machine). With these requirements, each actor
(e.g. a document consumer) is authenticated by exchanging X509 certificates
and corresponding private keys. Instead, healthcare professional authentication
is defined in the Cross Enterprise Document Assertion (XUA) profile [4]. If a
system is grouped with this profile, each message must contain a Security As-
sertion Markup Language (SAML) assertion [6], i.e., a security token encoded
using the XML language, providing the digital identity of the professional and
issued by a trusted third party named identity provider.
Creating a system grouping standard IHE profiles permits to drastically re-
duce errors due to missing healthcare information in paper-based clinics. EHRs
are always available to every patient and authorized healthcare professional
across the clinics. The probability to perform, e.g., duplicate medical tests and
examinations is then reduced significantly. The hardware running in each clinic
is reduced in costs: with an investment of a few thousands of U.S. dollars for
off-the-shelf components, a clinic can start to be operational in a few days.
3 Applying the protocol for disconnected clinics
The roadmap of the programme after the PoC phases is to increase the number
of hospitals and clinics involved in the E-HR.GP project. Although the Gauteng
6 M. Masi, R. Pugliese and F. Tiezzi
province is the geographically smallest province in South Africa, nowadays it
is the most densely populated2. Thus, up to 38 hospitals, 30 community health
clinics and around 300 clinics will participate in the exchange of medical records.
The PoC setting described in Section 2 fits perfectly within regions with
a high-speed Internet connection. Indeed, healthcare documents usually have
important dimensions (e.g., the size of DICOM [5] images can be larger than
one gigabyte) and, thus, their real-time exchange is expensive. For this reason,
nightly transfers to the central repository (i.e. the backup node) of the GDoH
are scheduled. Each transaction passes through a forward queue (see Section 2.1)
that duplicates the messages: a copy is sent to the local XDS affinity domain,
while the duplicated message is queued waiting to be transferred when the con-
nection link is operating. Unfortunately, in Gauteng, due to the limitations of
the Internet connectivity in some spots of the region (where network connection
is mainly based on GPRS and 56k modems), nightly transfers among clinics and
the repositories may not reach the termination, due to the large size of files.
The IHE initiative solves the above problem by introducing the Cross Enter-
prise Document Sharing using Portable Media (XDM) profile [4]. This specifica-
tion enables the usage of different types of electronic support, like CDs, DVDs,
and USB drivers, for the transmission of EHRs. By using the IHE grouping
mechanism mentioned in Section 2.2, XDM replaces in the XDS model the TLS
channels established from the forward queue to the endpoint of Data aggrega-
tor and Backup node with out-of-band channels, based on a car transportation
system. However, simply adopting the newly created system is not sufficient. In
fact a new security flaw would be introduced: by dropping the TLS channel,
the system would miss the authentication of the remote peer (the clinic). The
receiving system would not be able to trust the message carried by the portable
media because no key material is present that enforces authenticity. This flaw
would introduce serious drawbacks: a malicious intermediary could change the
message on the channel (resulting in a compromission of the safety of the pa-
tient) or could replay messages to get more medicines prescribed (e.g., for the
illegal market). In this way, the system security would be totally demanded to
the security of the out-of-band channel. Usually this channel is represented by
a van travelling among clinics for collecting portable media to be stored in the
central repository. The van is then a critical actor in the project security model.
A possible solution of such an authentication flaw, which does not put any
requirement on the security of the van itself, is presented in [9]. This work
introduces an ad-hoc protocol for exchanging medical records that exploits the
XDM standard. The protocol does not affect software already in production
stage and its adoption has a reduced impact on costs. Security of the protocol is
proved by using the formal methods described in [10], in particular the process
calculus COWS for formally modeling the protocol, the temporal logic SocL for
expressing the protocol’s security properties, and the model checker CMC for
verifying the properties over the model.
2 Around 9 millions, of which 90% are urbanized.
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The protocol is depicted in Figure 3. Each clinic has its own information sys-
tem where the communication channel between the actors Creator and Receiver
and the corresponding Audit Record Repositories (ARRs)3 is assumed to be se-
cure. Indeed, a clinic in a rural area is usually built in an environment composed
of a single machine or a few machines running in the same private local network
disconnected from the Internet, where network intrusions cannot be performed.
On the other hand, if a clinic is connected to the Internet (e.g., an hospital),
software like Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [11] can assure the authenticity
of the above mentioned channel. The scenario in Figure 3 is common for clinics
in rural areas, in which the information systems are running on ATNA secure
nodes. XDM, ATNA and XUA are grouped together, therefore the security token
that authenticates each message is a SAML assertion as per the XUA profile.
The protocol is based on an end-to-end scenario, where clinics cooperate
together to exchange messages. In the communication scenario, the clinic that
produces a document is named Creator and the clinic that receives the document
is named Receiver. Each clinic contains a security token service that is able to
authenticate the healthcare professional, and an ARR, as part of ATNA. The
ARR is a tamperproof hardware that stores the logging entries (i.e., the audit
trails) for all the transactions performed. The software components establish a
TLS channel with the ARR, as per ATNA specifications [4]. Whenever a doc-
ument is created, or a document needs to be retrieved, the corresponding XDS
3 The role of ARR A and ARR B, as well as the role of the Security Officer, will be
explained later on.
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message is enqueued into the forward queue. When the forward queue needs to
be transferred, the XDM component writes the messages to the portable me-
dia. This media is transferred to the receiver along the ‘communication channel’
represented by the van. The protocol, indeed, abstracts this car-transportation
system as a communication channel that permits to send a single chunck of data.
In fact, this channel does not satisfy any mutual authentication properties [12].
Each message contains a cryptographic secret created by the identity provider
of the creator clinic and encrypted for the clinic acting as a receiver. The secret
is also stored in the ARR of both clinics and it is the key used for tracing the
transaction and the message exchange in the channel represented by the van.
No information about the van or its driver needs to be stored in the messages
or in the associated audit trails. The message structure is maintained as per the
XDS/XDM specifications.
In order to perform analysis on the security of the protocol, a threat model is
proposed in [9]. In such a model, an attacker a` la Dolev-Yao [13] is used. Based
on the past experience of other e-Health projects (see, e.g., the NHIN threat
model [14]), our threat model identifies four different attacks with a particu-
lar attention to the scenario in rural areas. Most of the attacks are performed
(sometimes physically) to the car-transportation system. In the first attack, the
intruder suppresses a message (e.g., a submission for a new rare form of allergy).
In the second attack, the intruder is trying to impersonate an healthcare profes-
sional by reusing a token found in a stolen portable media. In the third attack,
the payload of the message is manipulated so to reuse the authentication to-
ken for obtaining different resources (e.g., different prescribed medicines). In the
fourth attack the intruder tries to replicate the message for obtaining the same
resource multiple times.
All the attacks are discovered by the design of the protocol, except the first. In
fact, in the scenario under study, where assuming clinics’ clocks be synchronized
is a too strong requirement, a new actor, called security officer, is introduced
to discover the threat. This officer, that can be enacted by an human being
polling the clinics in a round-robin fashion, reads the audit record repository
to keep track of the logging entries. By performing this action, he/she recog-
nizes time differences between the message sent and the message received by the
clinic nodes and is thus able to discover attacks based on message suppression.
Notably, the security officer is assumed to be a trustworthy actor. This assump-
tion is reasonable in the considered scenario. In fact, the security officer can
only manage signed and encrypted data and, moreover, a suppression of logging
entries is detected by the protocol.
It is worth noticing that the protocol can scale with a large number of clinics.
Indeed, we can apply the XDM-based protocol between disconnected clinics and
the classic XDS model in the other cases, and then exploit the hierarchical
organization of clinics enabled by XDS. The protocol is also designed to scale
with a great number of patients, by relying on the fact that a van can carry
many portable media and that, nowadays, electronic supports like DVDs and
USB drivers can store significant amounts of data.
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4 Related work
Providing EHRs for rural areas and disconnected clinics is a challenging research
field. An approach using Mesh networks is proposed in [15]. This approach has a
great benefit: a Mesh network infrastructure, which can be exploited for e-Health
purposes, is implementable with low-cost hardware. Our approach instead acts
at the software infrastructure level rather than at the hardware one, and has ba-
sically no additional costs, except those for adapting the software infrastructure
to be able to fulfill the requirements of [9] (to register secrets into ARRs and to
copy authentication tokens into portable media). If detection of lost messages is
needed, a security officer must be employed and trained.
Our protocol, firstly proposed in [9], has the advantage to be formally proved
against errors in a specific threat model. Formal analysis on security protocols
has given very good results in the last years (see, e.g., [16, 17, 18, 19]). A more
complete survey can be found in [20, 21]. The work closest to ours is [22] where a
generic communication infrastructure is proposed within a governmental project
in Mozambique. In that work, a “fat” client approach is taken, in which the
application and persistency layer reside on the local machine. Differently from
our approach, data exchanged are partially anonymized, since they are used for
statistical purposes, while we adopt a protocol that ensures authentication and
confidentiality of sensitive data.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we reported the experience on the first phases of the project E-
HR.GP running in Sebokeng, Gauteng, a province of South Africa. This project
aims at giving optimum patient care in the province by enabling an e-Health so-
lution based on international standards. The major drawback of this and other
similar projects in developing countries with rural areas is the low or absent
network connectivity. To cope with problems due to the lack of connectivity,
we propose to exchange messages by exploiting the international IHE standard
XDM, which permits the usage of portable media to share EHRs. However,
adopting this standard drops the requirement of having authenticated channels.
To recover authentication, we propose the use of a formally-proved secure proto-
col that amends the standard in order to provide a secure EHRs exchange with
disconnected clinics using a car-transportation system to bear portable media.
As we show in this work, just adopting international standards for the es-
tablishment of e-Health projects is not sufficient, because new security flaws
can be introduced. Our aim is to continue to use formal methods to analyse e-
Health projects for developing countries in order to tailor secure solutions with
an important level of technology and reduced costs.
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